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For decades, trade between countries in agricultural products has been distorted by 
policies of richer countries favoring their farmers with import barriers and subsidies. 
Agricultural trade has often also been limited by an anti-agricultural, pro-urban bias in many 
developing country policies. Both sets of policies have reduced national and global economic 
welfare. They also have added to inequality and poverty in developing countries, because 
three-quarters of the world’s billion poorest people depend on farming for their livelihood. 
Over the past two decades numerous developing country governments have reduced their 
sectoral and trade policy distortions, while some high-income countries also have begun 
reforming their farm protectionist policies. Drawing on results from a new multi-country 
World Bank research project, this paper summarizes estimates of the extent of those 
distortions to prices of farm products over the past 5 decades, and of their effect in reducing 
the integration of the world’s agricultural markets. 
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While the benefits from specialization in production and international exchange have been 
recognized for millennia, most governments restrict international trade to some extent, 
especially in agricultural goods. Sometimes it would be via export taxes, to raise government 
revenue or to lower the price of food for domestic consumers. More commonly it takes the 
form of import duties or bans. While food security concerns are sometimes mentioned as a 
reason for intervention in both sets of countries, for advanced economies the most likely 
reason for farm trade restrictions in the past century or more has been to protect domestic 
producers from import competition as they come under competitive pressure to shed labor in 
the course of economic development. In the process those protective measures hurt not only 
domestic consumers and exporters of other products but also foreign producers and traders of 
farm products, and they reduce national and global economic welfare. For many decades 
agricultural protection and subsidies in high-income (and some middle-income) countries 
have been depressing international prices of farm products, which lowers the earnings of 
farmers and associated rural businesses in developing countries. That worsened between the 
1950s and the early 1980s (Anderson, Hayami and Others 1986), thereby adding to global 
inequality and poverty because three-quarters of the world’s poorest people depend directly 
or indirectly on agriculture for their main income (World Bank 2008).  
In addition to this external policy influence on rural poverty, the governments of 
many developing countries have directly taxed their farmers over the past half-century. A 
well-known example is the taxing of exports of plantation crops in post-colonial Africa 
(Bates 1981). At the same time, many developing countries chose also to pursue an import- 
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substituting industrialization strategy, predominantly by restricting imports of manufactures, 
and to overvalue their currency. Together those measures indirectly taxed producers of other 
tradable products in developing economies, by far the most numerous of them being farmers 
(Krueger, Schiff and Valdés 1988, 1991).  
Thus the global integration of markets for farm products has been reduced by policies 
of both high-income and developing countries. This disarray in world agriculture, as D. Gale 
Johnson (1991) described it in the title of his seminal book, means there has been over-
production of farm products in high-income countries and under-production in more-needy 
developing countries. It also means there has been less international trade in farm products 
than would be the case under free trade, thereby thinning markets for these weather-
dependent products and thus making them more volatile. Using a stochastic model of world 
food markets, Tyers and Anderson (1992, Table 6.14) found that instability of international 
food prices in the early 1980s was three times greater than it would have been under free 
trade in those products.  
During the past quarter century, however, numerous countries have begun to reform 
their agricultural price and trade policies. To get a sense of how much that has increased the 
integration of global markets for farm products, the present chapter draws on the results of 
the recent World Bank multi-country study of distortions to agricultural price incentives over 
the past 5 decades. That study includes 75 countries that together account for 92 percent of 
the world’s population and agricultural GDP and 95 percent of total GDP. The sample 
countries also account for more than 85 percent of farm production and employment in each 
of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the transition economies of Europe and Central Asia, and 
their spectrum of per capita incomes ranges from among the poorest (Zimbabwe and 
Ethiopia) to among the richest (Norway).   
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Specifically, this chapter summarizes estimates of the nominal rates of assistance and 
consumer tax equivalents (NRAs and CTEs) for more than 70 different farm products, with 
an average of almost a dozen per country.
1
The chapter begins with the methodology used to generate annual indicators of the 
extent of government interventions in markets, details of which are provided in Anderson et 
al. (2008). The NRA and CTE estimates are then summarized across regions and over the 
decades since the 1950s. A summary is also provided of an additional set of indicators of 
agricultural price distortions that are based on the trade restrictiveness index first developed 
by Anderson and Neary (2005) and modified for the Bank’s research project by Lloyd, 
Croser and Anderson (2009). Then a new set of results from a global economy-wide model 
provide quantification of the impacts on global agricultural trade of the reforms since the 
early 1980s and of the policies still in place as of 2004. The chapter concludes by drawing on 
the lessons learned to speculate on the prospects for further increasing the global integration 
of agricultural markets.  
 Not all countries had data for the entire 1955-
2007 period, but the average number of years covered is 41 per country. Having such a 
comprehensive coverage of countries, products and years offers the prospect of obtaining a 
reliable picture of long-term trends in price-distorting policies (as well as annual fluctuations 
around those trends, not reported here) for country groups, regions, and the world as a whole 
(as well as for individual countries and commodities, also not reported here because of space 
limitations).  
 
Methodology for measuring the extent of policy induced price distortions 
 
                                                 
1 In aggregate the coverage represents just under two-thirds of global farm production valued at undistorted 
prices over the period covered. Of the world’s 30 most valuable agricultural products, the NRAs cover 77 
percent of global output, ranging from two-thirds for livestock, three-quarters for oilseeds and tropical crops, 
and five-sixths for grains and tubers. Those products represent an even higher share (85 percent) of global 
agricultural exports.  
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Government-imposed distortions can create a gap between domestic prices and what they 
would be under free markets. The Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) for each farm product 
is computed as the percentage by which government policies have raised gross returns to 
farmers above what they would be without the government’s intervention (or lowered them, 
if NRA<0). A weighted average NRA for all covered products is derived using the value of 
production at undistorted prices as weights (unlike the producer and consumer support 
estimates (PSEs and CSEs) computed by OECD (2008), which are expressed as a percentage 
of the distorted price). To that NRA for covered products is added a ‘guesstimate’ of the 
NRA for non-covered products (on average around 30 percent of the total value of farm 
production) and an estimate of the NRA from non-product-specific forms of assistance or 
taxation. Since the 1980s some high-income governments have also provided so-called 
‘decoupled’ assistance to farmers but, because that support in principle does not distort 
resource allocation, its NRA has been computed separately and is not included for direct 
comparison with the NRAs for other sectors or for developing countries. Each farm industry 
is classified either as import-competing, or a producer of exportables, or as producing a 
nontradable (with its status sometimes changing over the years), so as to generate for each 
year the weighted average NRAs for the two different groups of covered tradable farm 
products.  
Also computed is a production-weighted average NRA for nonagricultural tradables, 
for comparison with that for agricultural tradables via the calculation of a percentage Relative 








t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the 
agricultural (including non-covered) and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.
2
  Also considered is the extent to which consumers are taxed or subsidized. To do so, a 
Consumer Tax Equivalent (CTE) is calculated by comparing the price that consumers pay for 
their food and the international price of each food product at the border. Differences between 
the NRA and the CTE arise from distortions in the domestic economy that are caused by 
transfer policies and taxes/subsidies that cause the prices paid by consumers (adjusted to the 
farmgate level) to differ from those received by producers. In the absence of any other 
information, the CTE for each tradable farm product is assumed to be the same as the NRA 
from border distortions.  
 Since the 
NRA cannot be less than -100 percent if producers are to earn anything, neither can the RRA 
(since the weighted average NRAnonag
t is non-negative in all our country case studies). And 
if both of those sectors are equally assisted, the RRA is zero. This measure is useful in that if 
it is below (above) zero, it provides an internationally comparable indication of the extent to 
which a country’s sectoral policy regime has an anti- (pro-)agricultural bias.  
The cost of government policy distortions to incentives in terms of resource 
misallocation tend to be greater the greater the degree of substitution in production. In the 
case of agriculture which involves the use of farm land that is sector-specific but transferable 
among farm activities, the greater the variation of NRAs across industries within the sector 
then the higher will be the welfare cost of those market interventions. A simple indicator of 
dispersion is the standard deviation of the covered industries’ NRAs. 
However, it would be helpful to have a single indicator to capture the overall welfare 
effect of each country’s regime of agricultural price distortions in place at any time (taking 
                                                 
2 Farmers are affected not just by prices of their own products but also by the incentives nonagricultural 
producers face. That is, it is relative prices and hence relative rates of government assistance that affect 
producer incentives. More than seventy years ago Lerner (1936) provided his Symmetry Theorem that proved 
that in a two-sector economy, an import tax has the same effect as an export tax. This carries over to a model 
that also includes a third sector producing only nontradables.  
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account of both the mean and variance of the product NRAs and CTEs), and to trace its path 
over time and make cross-country comparisons. From the viewpoint of global integration, an 
index of the international trade volume effect of of national government interventions also 
would be helpful. To that end, the family of indexes first developed by Anderson and Neary 
(2005), under the catch-all name of trade restrictiveness indexes, is drawn upon.  
To generate partial equilibrium indicators of the impact of distortions imposed by 
each country’s border and domestic agricultural policies on its economic welfare and its 
agricultural trade volume, Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2009) define a Welfare Reduction 
Index (WRI) and a Trade Reduction Index (TRI) and estimate them for the same focus 
countries, taking into account that for some covered products the NRA and CTE differ 
(because there are domestic measures in place in addition to or instead of trade measures). As 
their names suggest, these two new indexes respectively each provide a single indicator of the 
direct welfare- or trade-reducing effects of distortions to consumer and producer prices of 
covered farm products from all agricultural and food price and trade policy measures in place 
(while ignoring non-covered farm products and indirect general equilibrium effects of 
sectoral and trade policy measures directed at non-agricultural sectors). Specifically, the WRI 
(or TRI) is that ad valorem trade tax  rate which, if applied uniformly to all farm commodities 
in a country that year would generate the same reduction in economic welfare (or trade) as 
the actual cross-commodity structure of agricultural NRAs and CTEs for that country, other 
things equal. 
The WRI measure reflects the partial equilibrium welfare cost of agricultural price-
distorting policies better than the NRA because it recognizes that the welfare cost of a 
government-imposed price distortion is related to the square of the price wedge. It thus 
captures the disproportionately higher welfare costs of peak levels of assistance or taxation, 
and is larger than the mean NRA/CTE and is positive regardless of whether the government’s  
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agricultural policy is favoring or hurting farmers. In this way the WRI and TRI go somewhat 
closer to what a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model can provide in the way of 
estimates of the trade and welfare (and other) effects of the price distortions captured by the 
product NRA and CTE estimates, while having the advantage over a CGE model of 
providing an annual time series and not requiring a formal model. 
 
Empirical estimates: muted global integration to the 1980s, but then some reforms  
 
The study launched by the World Bank in 2006 involved 75 countries (including 20 high-
income countries) that together account for more than 90 per cent of the world’s population 
and agricultural GDP. The global summary of these new results is provided in Figure 1. It 
reveals that the nominal rate of assistance to farmers in high-income countries rose steadily 
from the mid-1950s until the end of the 1980s, apart from a small dip when international food 
prices spiked around 1973-74. After peaking at more than 50 per cent in the mid-1980s, that 
average NRA for high-income countries has fallen a little, depending on the extent to which 
one believes that some new farm programs are ‘decoupled’ in the sense of no longer 
influencing production decisions. For developing countries, too, the average NRA for 
agriculture has been rising, but from a level of around −25 per cent during the period from the 
mid-1950s to the early 1980s to nearly 10 per cent in the first half of the present decade.  
The average NRA for developing countries conceals the fact that the exporting and 
import-competing subsectors of agriculture have very different NRAs. Figure 2 reveals that 
while the average NRA for exporters has been negative throughout (going from −20 per cent 
to −30 per cent before coming back up to almost zero in 2000-04), the NRA for import-
competing farmers in developing countries has fluctuated between 20 and 30 per cent (and 
even reached 40 per cent in the years of low prices in the mid-1980s). Having increased in the  
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1960s and 1970s, the anti-trade bias within agriculture (the taxing of both exports and 
imports of farm products) for developing countries has diminished since the mid-1980s, but 
the NRA gap between the import-competing and export subsectors still averages around 20 
percentage points. 
Figure 2 also reveals that the NRA for import-competing farmers in developing 
countries has increased at virtually the same pace as that in high-income countries. This 
suggests that growth in agricultural protection is something that begins at relatively low 
levels of per capita income rather than being a phenomenon exclusive to high-income 
countries.  
The improvement in farmers’ incentives in developing countries is understated by the 
above NRA estimates, because those countries have also reduced their assistance to 
producers of non-agricultural tradable goods, most notably manufactures. The decline in the 
weighted average NRA for the latter, depicted in Figure 3, was clearly much greater than the 
increase in the average NRA for tradable agricultural sectors for the period to the mid-1980s, 
consistent with the finding two decades ago of Krueger, Schiff and Valdés (1988, 1991). For 
the period since the mid-1980s, changes in the NRAs of both sectors have contributed almost 
equally to the improvement in incentives to farmers. The RRA, defined in the previous 
section, provides a useful indicator of relative price change: the RRA for developing 
countries as a group went from −46 per cent in the second half of the 1970s to 1 per cent in 
the first half of the present decade. This increase (from a coefficient of 0.54 to 1.01) is 
equivalent to an almost doubling in the relative price of farm products, which is a huge 
change in the fortunes of developing country farmers in just a generation. This is mostly 
because of the changes in Asia, but this relative price hike even for Latin America is one-half, 
while for Africa this indicator improves by only one-eighth. As for high-income countries, 
assistance to manufacturing was on average much less than assistance to farmers, even in the  
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1950s, and its decline since then has had only a minor impact on that group’s average RRA 
(Figure 3).
3
Turning to the single indicators of the impact of agricultural distortions on national 
economic welfare and trade volume, Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2009) estimate their TRI 
and WRI for the 75 countries in the above-mentioned World Bank study. The TRI estimates 
indicate that the trade-reducing impact of agricultural policies for developing countries as a 
group was roughly constant until the early 1990s and thereafter it declined, while for high-
income countries the decline in TRI began a few years later (Figure 4(a)). The TRI for 
developing countries is driven by the exportables subsector which was being taxed until 
recently and the import-competing subsector which was and is increasingly being protected 
(albeit less than in high-income countries – see Figure 2 above). For high-income countries, 
policies have supported both exporting and import-competing agricultural products and, even 
though they strongly favor the latter, the assistance to exporters has offset somewhat the anti-
trade bias from the protection of import-competing producers.  
 
The WRI estimates for agricultural policies, shown in Figure 4(b), indicate a steady 
rise from the 1960s to the 1980s, but some decline in the 1990s. This reflects the fact that 
NRAs for high-income and developing countries diverged (in opposite directions) away from 
zero in the first half of the period under study and then converged toward zero in the most 
recent quarter-century. That meant that, while their weighted average NRA traces out a fairly 
flat trend, the WRI traces out a hill-shaped path and thus provides a less misleading indicator 
of the trend in resource misallocation in world agricultural markets. 
   
Effects of past reforms and of remaining policies: results of economy-wide modelling  
                                                 
3 Australia and New Zealand were clear exceptions, where manufacturing protection had been very high and its 
decline occurred several decades later than in other high-income countries, so their RRAs have risen much like 




It is clear from the above that there has been a great deal of reform over the past quarter of a 
century of policy distortions to agricultural incentives throughout the world: the anti-
agricultural and anti-trade biases of the policies of many developing countries have been 
reduced, and the farm export subsidies of high-income countries have been cut. As well, there 
has been some re-instrumentation toward less inefficient and less trade-distorting forms of 
agricultural support, particularly in Western Europe (see the dashed line in Figure 1). 
However, protection from agricultural import competition has continued to show an upward 
trend in both rich and poor countries, notwithstanding the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture that aimed to bind and reduce farm tariffs.  
What have been the net economic effects of agricultural price and trade policy 
changes around the world since the early 1980s? And how do those effects on global markets, 
farm incomes and economic welfare compare with the effects of policy distortions that were 
still in place as of 2004? Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugghe and Anderson (2009) use a global 
economy-wide model known as Linkage (van der Mensbrugghe 2005) to provide a combined 
retrospective and prospective analysis that sought to assess how far the world had come, and 
how far it still has to go, in rectifying the disarray in world agriculture. Those authors 
quantify the impacts both of past reforms and current policies by comparing the effects of the 
recent World Bank project’s distortion estimates for the period 1980-84 with those of 2004.
4
Several key findings from that economy-wide modelling study are worth summarizing 
here. First, the policy reforms from the early 1980s to the mid-2000s improved global 
economic welfare by US$233 billion per year, and removing the distortions that remained in 
2004 would add another US$168 billion per year (in 2004 US dollars). This suggests that in 
  
                                                 
4 While international food prices in mid-2008 were well above those of 2004, the slump in these prices over the 
second half of 2008 suggests that prices in 2009 may not be so different from those of 2004, and in any case the 
Doha round negotiations have been using such a historical period against which to draw up reform proposals.  
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terms of global welfare the world moved three-fifths of the way towards global free trade in 
goods over that quarter century. 
Second, developing economies benefited proportionately more than high-income 
economies (1.0 per cent compared with 0.7 per cent of national income) from those past 
policy reforms, and would gain nearly twice as much as high-income countries if all countries 
were to complete that reform process (an average increase of 0.9 per cent compared with 
0.5 per cent for high-income countries from freeing the distortions in place in 2004). Of those 
prospective welfare gains from global goods trade liberalization, 70 per cent would come 
from agriculture and food policy reform. This is a striking result given that the shares of 
agriculture and food in global GDP and global trade are only 3 and 6 per cent, respectively. 
The contribution of farm and food policy reform to the prospective welfare gain for 
developing countries alone is slightly greater, at 72 per cent. 
Third, the share of global farm production exported (excluding intra-European Union 
(EU) trade) in 2004 has been slightly smaller as a result of those reforms since 1980-84, 
because of less farm export subsidies. The 8 per cent share for agriculture in 2004 contrasts 
with the 31 per cent share for other primary products and the 25 per cent for all other goods – 
a ‘thinness’ that is an important contributor to the volatility of international prices for 
weather-dependent farm products. If the policies distorting goods trade in 2004 were 
removed, the share of global production of farm products that is exported would rise from 8 
to 13 per cent, thereby reducing instability of prices and expanding the quantities of those 
products traded. 
Fourth, the developing countries’ share of the world’s primary agricultural exports 
rose from 43 to 55 per cent, and its share of global farm output from 58 to 62 per cent, 
because of the reforms since the early 1980s, with rises in output of nearly all agricultural 
industries except rice and sugar. Removing the remaining goods market distortions as of 2004  
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would boost the developing countries’ shares of global agricultural exports and output even 
further, to 64 and 65 per cent, respectively. 
Fifth, the average real price for agricultural and food products in international markets 
would have been 13 per cent lower had policies not changed over the past quarter century. 
Evidently the impact of the fall in RRA in high-income countries (including the cuts in farm 
export subsidies) in raising international food prices more than offset the opposite impact of 
the RRA rise (including the cuts in agricultural export taxes) in developing countries over 
that period. By contrast, removing the remaining distortions as of 2004 is projected to raise 
the international price of agricultural and food products by less than 1 per cent on average. 
This is in contrast to earlier modelling results based on the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) protection database. (For example, Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe 
(2006) estimated that they would rise by 3.1 per cent or, for primary agriculture alone, by 5.5 
per cent). The smaller impact seen in these new results is because export taxes in developing 
countries, based on the above NRA estimates for 2004, are included in the new database 
(most notably for Argentina) and their removal would offset considerably the international 
price-raising effect of eliminating import protection and farm subsidies elsewhere. 
Sixth, for developing countries as a group, net farm income (value added in 
agriculture) is estimated to be 4.9 per cent higher than it would have been without the reforms 
of the past quarter century, which is more than ten times the proportional reform gain in non-
agricultural value added. If the price and trade policies remaining in 2004 were removed, net 
farm incomes in developing countries would rise a further 5.6 per cent, compared with just 
1.9 per cent for non-agricultural value added. In addition, unskilled workers in developing 
countries – the majority of whom work on farms – would see their returns rise more than 
returns on other productive factors from that liberalization. Together, these findings suggest  
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that both inequality and poverty could be alleviated by such reform, given that three-quarters 
of the world’s poor are farmers in developing countries (Chen and Ravallion 2008). 
 
Prospects for further agricultural reform  
 
The reasons why some countries have reformed their price-distorting agricultural and trade 
policies more than others in recent decades are varied. Some have reformed unilaterally, 
apparently having become convinced that it is in their own national interest to do so. China is 
the most dramatic and significant example of the past three decades among developing 
countries, and Australia and New Zealand among the high-income countries (Huang et al. 
2009; Anderson, Lloyd and MacLaren 2007). Other developing countries may have done so 
partly to secure bigger and better loans from international financial institutions and then, 
having taken that first step, they continued the process, even if somewhat intermittently. India 
is one example, but there are numerous other examples in Africa and Latin America. Few 
have gone backwards in terms of increasing their anti-agricultural bias, but Zimbabwe and 
perhaps Argentina qualify during the present decade – and numerous others joined them in 
2008, at least temporarily, in response to the sudden upward spike in international food 
prices. And some have reduced their agricultural subsidies and import barriers at least partly 
in response to the GATT’s multilateral Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, the 
European Union (EU) being the most important example (helped by its desire for otherwise 
costly preferential trade agreements, including its expansions eastwards in 2004 and 2007 and 
its preferential trading arrangements with former colonies and other least-developed 
countries). The United States, by contrast, has slipped back into higher support after showing 
signs of reform in the latter 1990s (Orden, Blandford and Josling 2010).  
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The EU reforms suggest that growth in agricultural protection can be slowed and even 
reversed if accompanied by re-instrumentation away from price supports to decoupled 
measures or more direct forms of farm income support (Josling 2009). The starker examples 
of Australia and New Zealand show that one-off buyouts can bring faster and even complete 
reform.
5
Indeed, there are numerous signs that the governments of developing countries want 
to keep open their options to raise agricultural NRAs in the future, particularly via import 
restrictions. One indicator is the high tariff bindings to which developing countries 
committed themselves following the Uruguay Round: as of 2001, actual applied tariffs on 
agricultural products averaged less than half the corresponding bound tariffs for developing 
countries of 48 per cent, and less than one-sixth in the case of least-developed countries 
(Anderson and Martin 2006, Table 1.2).  
 But in the developing countries where levels of agricultural protection are generally 
below those in high-income countries, there are fewer signs of a slowdown of the upward 
trend in agricultural protection from import competition over the past half-century.  
Another indicator of reluctance about agricultural trade reform is the demand by many 
developing countries to be allowed to maintain their rates of agricultural protection for 
reasons of food security, livelihood security and rural development. This view has succeeded 
in bringing ‘special products’ and a ‘special safeguard mechanism’ into the multilateral 
trading system’s agricultural negotiations, even though such policies, which would raise 
domestic food prices in developing countries, may worsen poverty and reduce the food 
security of the poor (Ivanic and Martin 2008), and would exacerbate instability in 
international markets for farm products. 
                                                 
5 Anderson, Lloyd and MacLaren (2007). For a detailed analysis of the buyout option versus the slower and less 
complete cashout option (moving to direct payments), as well as the uncompensated gradual squeeze-out or 
sudden cutout options, see Orden and Diaz-Bonilla (2006).  
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Those developing economies that continue to free up domestic markets and practice 
good macroeconomic governance will keep growing. Typically the growth will be more rapid 
in manufacturing and service activities than in agriculture, especially in the more densely 
populated countries where agricultural comparative advantage is likely to decline. Whether 
such economies become more dependent on imports of farm products depends, however, on 
what happens to their relative RRA. The first wave of Asian industrialisers (Japan, and then 
Korea and Taiwan), like some western European countries before them, chose to slow the 
growth of dependence on food imports by raising their NRA for agriculture even as they were 
bringing down their NRA for non-farm tradables, such that their RRA became increasingly 
further above the neutral zero level. A key question is: will later industrialisers copy 
advanced economies, given the past close association of RRAs with rising per capita income 
and falling agricultural comparative advantage? Figures 2 and 3 suggest developing 
countries’ RRA trends of the past three decades have been on the same upward trajectory as 
the high-income countries prior to the 1990s. So unless new forces affect their polities, the 
governments of later industrialising economies may well follow suit. 
One new force is disciplines on farm subsidies and protection policies of WTO 
Members since the Uruguay Round. Earlier industrialisers were not bound under GATT to 
limit their agricultural protection. Had there been strict disciplines on farm trade measures at 
the time Japan and Korea joined GATT in 1955 and 1967, respectively, their NRAs may have 
been halted at less than 20 per cent (Anderson 2009, Figure 1.12). At the time of China’s 
accession to WTO in December 2001, its NRA was less than 5 per cent according to Huang 
et al. (2009), or 7.3 per cent for import-competing agriculture alone. Its average bound import 
tariff commitment was about twice that (16 per cent in 2005), but what matters most is 
China’s out-of-quota bindings on the items whose imports are restricted by tariff rate quotas. 
These tariff bindings, as of 2005, were 65 per cent for grains, 50 per cent for sugar and 40 per  
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cent for cotton (Anderson, Martin and Valenzuela 2009). Clearly the legal commitments even 
China made on acceding to WTO are a long way from current levels of support for its 
farmers, and so are unlikely to constrain the government very much in the next decade or so. 
The legal constraints on developing countries that joined the WTO earlier are even less 
restrictive. For India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, for example, their estimated NRAs for 
agricultural importables in 2000–2004 are 34, 4 and 6 per cent, respectively, whereas the 
average bound tariffs on their agricultural imports are 114, 96 and 189 per cent, respectively 
(WTO, ITC and UNCTAD 2007). Also, like other developing countries, they have high 
bindings on product-specific domestic supports of 10 per cent and another 10 per cent for 
non-product specific assistance, a total of 20 more percentage points of NRA (17 per cent in 
China’s case) that legally could come from domestic support measures – compared with 10 
per cent currently in India and less than 3 per cent in the rest of South Asia.  
Given this need to tighten the constraints on agricultural protection and assistance 
policies, it is especially unfortunate that the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda is struggling 
to deliver a new agreement, and makes it more likely that developing countries will follow 
the same agricultural protection path this century as that taken last century by high-income 
countries. 
There are some relatively new forces at work that have recently, and will continue to 
raise international prices of farm products above what they would otherwise be, and thus 
reduce the NRAs of countries that maintain constant domestic prices. One is the emergence 
of demand for biofuels, which is driven largely by subsidies and mandates in the United 
States and EU (whose NRA equivalents have yet to be calculated for those countries). 
Another is the growth of demand for protein-rich foods (e.g., livestock products) in rapidly 
emerging economies such as China. Global climate change also is expected to raise the mean 
(and variance) of international prices of farm products, thereby raising the denominator of the  
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domestic-to-border price ratio. By contrast, the emergence of the new biotechnologies that 
provide genetically modified (GM) foods, feedstuffs, fibres and biofuels are helping to lower 
international food prices – although not in those countries that are banning the production and 
importation of GM farm products. Such bans purportedly are for local food safety and 
environmental reasons, although countries that have adopted and export GM crops suspect 
these new protective measures also have a traditional economic protective motive. Regardless 
of the rationale for those bans, the new biotechnologies on the one hand are providing lower-
cost (and potentially higher quality and less-pollutive) farm products in those developing 
countries that share the view of current adopters that this is a benign technology.
6
 
 On the 
other hand, until there is general acceptance of GM technology globally this issue is going to 
be a force that fragments the world into two parts: the group of countries that accept the 
technology and enjoy lower-priced farm products, and the residual set of countries where 
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Figure 1: Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture in high-income countries (HIC) and 
European transition economies
a and in developing countries, 1955 to 2004 















a Denoted by the World Bank as ECA, for (Central and Eastern) Europe and Central Asia. 
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Figure 3: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural and non-agricultural sectors and relative 
rate of assistance,
a developing and high-income countries, 1955 to 2004  
(per cent, production-weighted averages across countries) 







































t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively. 
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Figure 4: Trade reduction and welfare reduction indexes for tradable farm products, by 
region, 1960 to 2007  
(percent) 
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Figure 4 (continued): Trade reduction and welfare reduction indexes for tradable farm 
products, by region, 1960 to 2007  
(percent) 
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Source: Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2009), based on NRAs and CTEs in Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008). 
 